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Abstract—Blockchain is a promising technology for estab-
lishing trust in IoT networks, where network nodes do
not necessarily trust each other. Cryptographic hash links
and distributed consensus mechanisms ensure that the data
stored on an immutable blockchain can not be altered or
deleted. However, blockchain mechanisms do not guarantee
the trustworthiness of data at the origin. We propose a layered
architecture for improving the end-to-end trust that can be
applied to a diverse range of blockchain-based IoT applica-
tions. Our architecture evaluates the trustworthiness of sensor
observations at the data layer and adapts block verification
at the blockchain layer through the proposed data trust and
gateway reputation modules. We present the performance
evaluation of the data trust module using a simulated indoor
target localization and the gateway reputation module using
an end-to-end blockchain implementation, together with a
qualitative security analysis for the architecture.
1. Introduction
In recent years, Internet of Things (IoT) technology
has attracted great interest of researchers and industry
due to the broad range of potential applications and its
impact on business and society through devising added
values for existing services or creating new ones. At its
core, IoT relies on sensors to capture observations of
the physical domain and record them digitally, effectively
converting continuous physical signals into digital signals
in the process. In other words, IoT provides observations
of the true state of the physical domain. These obser-
vations may be subject to noise, bias, sensor drift, or
malicious alterations. Trust in IoT systems is critical at
three distinct levels: (1) the data layer that relates to
sensor and other observational data; (2) the interaction
layer that relates to communications among devices in
the IoT network; and (3) the application layer that relates
to data processing and the interactions between service
providers and service users [1].
IoT applications require trust mechanisms that cut
across these levels to ensure the end-to-end integrity of
the collected data and the associated interactions. Key
to fulfilling these requirements is the transparency of
data collection processes and the associated interactions,
in addition to the ability to audit these processes and
interactions. Both the transparency and auditability re-
quirements motivate the consideration of blockchain to
underpin trust in IoT.
Blockchain is a distributed ledger that was originally
proposed as the underlying technology for bitcoin [2]
and other cryptocurrencies, and has since been ap-
plied to non-monetary applications. Blockchain is im-
mutable as it is jointly managed by network participants
through a consensus mechanism, such as Proof-of-Work
(PoW) [3], Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [4], or Proof-of-Elapsed-
Time (PoET) [5]. Consensus delivers agreement among
the network participants, which are untrusted, on the
current state of the ledger. In effect, trust in the current
state is decentralised due to its coupling to the outcome
of distributed consensus among the participants.
In the context of IoT, blockchain provides an im-
mutable audit trail of sensor observations by linking the
hash of the sensor data to blockchain transactions [6].
The transactions themselves record immutable records
of interactions among IoT devices and other network
entities. Transactions are grouped into blocks that are
linked through cryptographic hash functions to previous
blocks in the chain, making it virtually impossible to alter
previously stored blocks without detection. Using public
key cryptography, blockchain can verify the authenticity
of IoT transactions and blocks [7], before they are added
to the blockchain. Once the blocks are mined into the
blockchain, we have a guarantee that the inter-node inter-
actions recorded in the block’s transactions are securely
recorded and are tamper-proof. Providing a tamper-proof
audit trail of inter-node interactions is a necessary but
insufficient element to deliver end-to-end trust in IoT.
Storing the hash of the data on the blockchain does
ensure that the integrity of the stored data can be verified
by comparing its hash against the blockchain-stored hash
value. The authenticity of the observational data itself in
the first place, however, is not guaranteed. As IoT data is
an observation of the physical environment, its capture
can involve noise, bias, sensor drift, or manipulation by
a malicious entity. The immutability of blockchain does
not protect against this risk associated with data capture,
as inaccurate observational data that is secured with
blockchain may not be useful to the IoT end users.
The discussion above highlights the intertwined na-
ture of trust in IoT involving both the inter-node in-
teractions and the data capture process. Existing works
approach IoT trust problem as two separate problems,
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and propose reputation and trust mechanisms for ei-
ther IoT data capture or inter-node interactions. There
is therefore a clear need for an integrated architecture
to deliver end-to-end trust that cuts across the data
collection and blockchain node interactions in IoT. To
address this problem, we propose a layered trust archi-
tecture for blockchain-based IoT applications. Our archi-
tecture provides end-to-end trust from data observation
to blockchain validation. To enhance trust in observa-
tional data, we use the observer’s long-term reputation,
its own confidence in its data, and corroborating data
from neighboring observers. Trust at the block genera-
tion level is established based on verifying transactions
through our adaptive block validation mechanism. The
main contributions of this paper are:
• A layered trust architecture for IoT blockchain
networks that delivers end-to-end trust from data
observation to blockchain validation
• Evaluation of the proposed IoT data observation
trust mechanism through a simulated target local-
ization scenario
• A customized blockchain architecture for IoT built
on lightweight block generation, adaptive block
validation, and distributed consensus mechanisms
• Implementation of the end-to-end trust architec-
ture using a customized blockchain for IoT appli-
cations
• Qualitative security analysis of the proposed ar-
chitecture against possible attack scenarios
The paper is organized as follows: The related
work is summarized in Section 2. Section 3 describes
the proposed trust architecture. Section 4 presents the
blockchain architecture. The performance evaluation is
given in Section 5. Section 6 presents the qualitative
security analysis, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
Distributed trust methods have been proposed [8]
whereby multiple observer nodes within spatial or tem-
poral proximity independently corroborate nearby obser-
vations, yet these methods have been so far considered
independently from auditability, transparency, and trust
mechanisms of the blockchain. Yan et al. conducted a
survey on IoT trust management mechanisms and their
objectives in [9]. More recent works focus on integrat-
ing the trust and reputation management mechanisms
into blockchain-based IoT applications. The structure of
blockchain-based applications require decentralization of
trust and reputation management mechanisms. Further-
more, since blockchain technology has been applied to a
diverse range of IoT applications with different network
topologies, rules of participation and governance, and
interactions between nodes, current trust and reputation
management proposals are application-specific. These
proposals can be categorized based on the layer at which
the reputation and trust mechanisms work as: IoT data
capture and blockchain node interactions.
IoT Data Capture: Lu et al. [10] proposed the
blockchain based Anonymous Reputation System (BARS),
which uses direct historical interactions and indirect
opinions about vehicles to establish a trusted communi-
cation environment for vehicular applications. Their sys-
tem determines the trust level of broadcasted messages
based on the reputation score of the vehicles. Kang et
al. [11] proposed a reputation based high-quality data
sharing scheme for vehicular networks using a consor-
tium blockchain, smart contracts, and a subjective logic
model, which relies on interaction frequency, event time-
liness, and trajectory similarity for reputation manage-
ment. In [12], authors proposed a distributed trust man-
agement scheme to calculate the credibility of exchanged
messages based on the reputation value of observers in
blockchain based vehicular networks.
Blockchain Node Interactions: In [13], the authors in-
troduced the Delegated Proof-of-Stake consensus scheme
for secure data sharing in blockchain-enabled Internet
of Vehicles. They used reputation-based voting to select
the miners, where the reputation of the miner candi-
dates are calculated utilizing a multi-weight subjective
logic scheme. They also proposed a contract theory
based mechanism to incentivize the standby miners to
participate in block verification. In [7], a Lightweight
Scalable Blockchain (LSB) for IoT was proposed with
an IoT friendly consensus algorithm that incorporates a
distributed trust method to the block verification mech-
anism. The proposed architecture has two tiers: overlay,
and smart home networks. Based on direct and indirect
evidence, the overlay network nodes build trust, which is
used to reduce the number of transactions to be validated
in a new block.
In summary, the existing approaches for providing
trust in blockchain based IoT applications either con-
sider the data capture process for improving the trust
in IoT data or the inter-node interactions for the nodes
participating in the blockchain network. Consequently,
they do not provide end-to-end trust. In this paper, we
propose a trust architecture that takes into account both
the data and the blockchain layers to improve the end-
to-end trust.
3. Trust Architecture
We propose a blockchain-based layered trust archi-
tecture for IoT as shown in Fig. 1. The architecture
includes three key layers, namely the data layer, the
blockchain layer, and the application layer. The data layer
involves the collection of observational data from IoT
devices and other sources, such as manually entered
data by regulators or social media streams, that represent
observations of physical events. For simplicity, we use
sensor nodes and IoT devices interchangeably to refer to
the data sources in the rest of the paper. Observational
data is hashed and can be stored off-the-chain, while
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Figure 1: The proposed layered trust architecture.
transactions recording its collection and communication
are stored on the blockchain. The blockchain layer re-
ceives transactions from the data layer, and maintains the
blockchain while having bi-directional interactions with
the application layer. The application layer is respon-
sible for data processing and providing services to the
end-users. Depending on the application-specific require-
ments or the specifications received from the end-users,
the application layer communicates with the blockchain
layer to adapt the block validation mechanism.
Our architecture introduces two key modules for trust
management: (1) the data trust module; and (2) the
gateway reputation module. The data trust module quan-
tifies the confidence in specific observational data based
on: the evidence from other nearby data sources; the
reputation of the data source based on the long-term
behaviour; and the confidence level of the observation
reported by the data source. It uses inputs from the data
layer and records the trust value of observations into their
associated transactions. The reputation module tracks a
blockchain network participant’s long-term reliability. It
inputs information from the blockchain layer on a partic-
ipant’s reputation history, and continuously updates the
reputation to provide it to both the blockchain and appli-
cation layers. The blockchain layer can use the updated
reputation to dynamically adapt its transaction or block
validation requirements of other participants [7], where
blocks from more trustworthy receive less scrutiny. The
application layer can use updated reputation scores to
offer economic incentives to highly reputable nodes, such
as through increased business interactions. The reputa-
tion module can also incorporate external inputs, such as
a participant’s reputation from external systems, referred
to as reputation transfer [14]. Next, we introduce the
underlying network model for the proposed architecture
before proceeding to the details of the proposed trust and
reputation mechanisms.
3.1. Network Model
Due to the resource constraints and the limited capa-
bilities of IoT nodes, we consider a two-tiered IoT network
model as shown in Fig. 2, which is application agnostic,
G2 G1
Gi
GN
Si2
Si1
SiK
Blockchain Overlay Network
Gateways = {Gi}

Sensor nodes = {Sij} 
Figure 2: Two-tiered network structure. Data is collected
by IoT devices connected to gateway nodes, which main-
tain the blockchain overlay network.
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Figure 3: The block structure generated by a gateway
node.
and can be used for a diverse range of IoT applications.
The tiered model is a generic architecture for constrained
IoT networks [15]. The upper tier consists of a set of
gateway nodes G = {G1,G2, . . . ,GN } that constitutes the
blockchain overlay network. Without loss of generality,
we assume that each gateway node Gi is associated
with a set of K sensor nodes Si = {Si 1,Si 2, . . . ,Si K } and
responsible for collecting data from the sensor nodes
and maintaining a blockchain network by participating in
the block generation and block validation processes. The
lower tier consists of the sensor nodes, which collect data
from the environment and transmit the collected data to
the associated gateways through transactions. The sensor
nodes associated with the same gateway and in close
proximity to each other are assumed to have correlated
observations (eg. acoustic sensors in a room). For larger
networks where a large number of nodes are associated
with a gateway, nodes can be clustered so that observa-
tions within the same cluster are highly correlated [16].
Every node in the network holds a unique public and
private key pair. During the network initialization phase,
nodes register to the network using their public keys
and digital profiles are created for the nodes on the
blockchain to record their public keys, their network
associations (i.e. the public keys of the associated nodes),
and their reputation scores. Nodes use their private keys
to sign their transactions. These signatures can be verified
by the gateway nodes, which have access to the public
keys of the nodes recorded in their digital profiles.
3.2. Trust and Reputation Mechanisms
Having defined the key components of our trust ar-
chitecture, we now focus on generic mechanisms for
managing trust and reputation within this framework.
3.2.1. Trust Management. Recall that trust in our archi-
tecture refers to the instantaneous confidence in observa-
tions. Assuming that neighboring sensor nodes connected
to the same gateway have correlated observations due to
close proximity, the observations of neighbouring sensor
nodes can be used as evidence for the trustworthiness
of a sensor observation. This intuition builds on sensor
network trust frameworks in [17]. Sensor nodes build a
history of reputation based on the evidence of other sen-
sor node observations. A sensor node whose observations
are supported by evidence most of the time has a higher
reputation than a sensor node whose observations are not
supported.The reputation component in our data trust
mechanism represents a node’s long-term behaviour and
affects the trust value of the observation data it provides.
While the long-term reputation of a sensor node evolves
with time, the trust value of the data is instantaneous for
each observation. The other element that feeds into trust-
ing a particular observation from a sensor node, which
has yet to be considered, is the node’s own confidence or
uncertainty in its observations. For instance, a location
estimate obtained from GPS is often associated with a
position uncertainty estimate, which is the GPS module’s
estimate of error based on the received satellite signal and
algorithm features [18]. Including this uncertainty into the
trust computation for the location observation provides
the observer’s own account of possible inaccuracies in
its measurement. As a result, we model the trust in an
observation Obser vati oni j at the data layer as:
Tr usti j = f (Tsensi j ,Tr epi j ,T con fi j ) (1)
where f is a function mapping the evidence from other
sensor node observations Tsensi j , the reputation of the
sensor node Tr epi j , as well as the node’s uncertainty
in its observation T con fi j , to the trust level Tr usti j
in this observation. All the terms refer to values at the
current time t , so we omit this notation for simplicity.
Evidence supporting the observation, higher reputation of
the data source, as well as lower observation uncertainty
should all lead to a higher trust value in the obser-
vation. The definition of the mapping f and the trust
components (i.e., evidence, reputation, and confidence)
are application-specific and dependent on the relevant
sensing modalities. To illustrate how the gateway nodes
can assign the trust values to sensor observations, let us
consider the simple mapping:
Tr usti j = Tsensi j ×Tr epi j ×T con fi j (2)
and Figure 3, where the gateway Gi receives transactions
from the associated sensor nodes and creates a new
block with the received transactions. In this block, every
transaction is signed by the sensor node generating the
transaction, and the gateway node for authentication.
Confidence of the data source (T con fi j ): Confidence
of the data source represents how confident the data
source is in its observation and can be modelled as a
variable T con fi j ∈ [0,1], whose value is determined by
the data source and transmitted to the gateway together
with the observation. Thus, the transaction from the data
source Si j to the gateway Gi becomes:
T xi j = [Obser vati oni j |T con fi j |PKi j |Si gi j ] (3)
where PKi j and Si gi j are the public key and the signature
of the node Si j , respectively. The confidence of the data
source depends on the application-specific confidence
model. As an example, the confidence of a GPS sensor
node would be high when the received GPS signal is
strong, and low when the received signal is weak. Further-
more, a fixed confidence value can be assigned to nodes
who do not receive any GPS fix. In Section 4, we will
present a confidence model for sensor nodes that use the
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) for determining
the proximity of a beacon node for the indoor target
localization application.
Evidence from other observations (Tsensi j ): The
gateway uses the correlation in sensor observations to
calculate the evidence component for the trust in obser-
vations. The gateway Gi calculates the evidence Tsensi j
for the observation Obser vati oni j based on the data
received from the neighboring sensor nodes of Si j . The
neighborhood information is recorded in the profiles
of the nodes on blockchain. If a sensor observation
Obser vati oni m supports Obser vati oni j , it increases
Tsensi j by a value proportional to its own observation
confidence T con fi m . Otherwise, if Obser vati oni m does
not support Obser vati oni j , it decreases Tsensi j by a
value proportional to T con fi m . The proposed confidence
weighted evidence calculation is given by:
Tsensi j = 1|Nij|
× ∑
Si k∈Nij
1
j
i k ∗T con fi k (4)
where
1
j
i k =
{
1, if Obser vati oni k supports Obser vati oni j
−1, otherwise.
and Nij denotes the set of the neighboring sensor nodes of
Si j . The support condition in Eq. 4 is application-specific.
As an example, for acoustic sensor observations, the dif-
ference between the measurements can be compared to a
threshold value to determine if the observations support
each other or not.
Reputation of the data source (Tr epi j ): There is a
clear interplay between the trust level in an observa-
tion and the data source’s long-term reputation. Higher
reputation of a node leads to higher trust in the node
observation. The reputation of a data source evolves in
time and is updated by its responsible gateway node. The
governing principle of reputation update based on the
observation confidence and the evidence of other obser-
vations is the following: the reputation reward or penalty
must be proportional to the reported confidence. If node
Si j has high confidence in its observation (i.e. T con fi j ≥
confidence threshold) and the observation is substantiated
by other nodes (i.e. Tsensi j ≥ evidence threshold), Si j
should receive a significant increase ∆RepH in its rep-
utation Tr epi j . Conversely, if Si j delivers observations
with high confidence that are refuted by other nodes,
its reputation should also drop significantly. Similarly,
rewards and penalties ∆RepL for observations with low
confidence should be lower, i.e. ∆RepL <∆RepH .
Tr epi j =

Tr epi j +∆RepH , high T con fi j , high Tsensi j
Tr epi j +∆RepL , low T con fi j , high Tsensi j
Tr epi j −∆RepH , high T con fi j , low Tsensi j
Tr epi j −∆RepL , low T con fi j , low Tsensi j
(5)
Malicious nodes may then be compelled to report er-
roneous values with low confidence in order to perturb
the system. While such nodes will not suffer a significant
drop in reputation for each observation, their actions
can be countered by: (1) proper design of the function
weighting high uncertainty measurements in the trust
level calculation; and (2) design of the reputation score
update mechanism to penalise repetitive low confidence
observations from the same node.
Note that, the data trust block proposed in our archi-
tecture is modular and can be adapted for different appli-
cations. For example, depending on the spatio-temporal
properties of the physical phenomenon being observed
by the sensor nodes, spatial and temporal correlation
of observations can be incorporated in the trust calcu-
lations. Once Tr epi j and Tr usti j values are computed
for Obser vati oni j by the associated gateway Gi , they
can be included as part of the transaction that records
the occurrence of the observation in the blockchain. This
provides an auditable account of the trust estimate of
the generated data and the reputation of the data source
in the blockchain. Figure 3 presents the block structure
generated by the gateway node Gi . After validation by
the other nodes, which maintain the blockchain overlay
network, this block is appended to the blockchain.
3.2.2. Gateway Reputation. This section presents the
gateway reputation module, which updates the reputa-
tions to be used by the adaptive block validation process
to integrate the data trust mechanism to the blockchain
layer.
Once a gateway node generates a new block, this
block should be validated by validators before being
appended to the blockchain. For the proposed trust ar-
chitecture, the block validation involves: (1) validating the
data transactions by checking the public keys of the data
sources and their signatures in the transactions; and (2)
validating the trust values assigned by the gateway to
the observations by recalculating the trust values with
the data available in the generated block and on the
blockchain. The gateway reputation module tracks the
long-term behaviour of gateway nodes and adapts the
block validation depending on the reputation of the cur-
rent gateway node. The proposed reputation module is
inspired by [7], which receives frequent updates from
the blockchain layer, where each node’s honesty in block
mining, B(Gi ), is reported based on direct and indirect
evidence, and used to update the node’s reputation score.
Our reputation module further integrates the data trust
mechanism to the block validation process by validating:
(1) the observation trust values assigned by the gateway,
and (2) the sensor transactions reported in the block to
update the reputation score of the gateway node. External
sources of a node’s reputation E xt (Gi ), which can be
imported from other systems, can also be fed into the
node’s reputation score. In summary, the reputation score,
Rep(Gi ) ∈ [Repmi n ,Repmax ], of node Gi is based on a
function g :
Rep(Gi )= g [T (Gi ),B(Gi ),E xt (Gi )] (6)
where T (Gi ) captures how much other validator nodes
trust Gi based on Gi ’s trust value assignment to the
observations.
We propose a reputation update mechanism that con-
siders the validity of sensor transactions and the cor-
rectness of the associated trust values. The reputation
of the gateway node increases if the generated block is
validated, and decreases otherwise.
Rep(Gi )=
{
mi n(Repmax ,Rep(Gi )+∆R),block is validated
max(Repmi n ,Rep(Gi )−β.∆R), otherwise
(7)
where ∆R is the reputation increase step, and β.∆R is the
reputation reduction step. For β > 1, it is harder for the
gateway nodes to build reputation than to lose it.
4. Blockchain Architecture
In [7], the Lightweight Scalable Blockchain (LSB) that
is optimized for IoT requirements has been proposed.
Inspired by LSB, we propose a private blockchain for
our trust architecture with a lightweight block generation
mechanism, reputation-based adaptive block validation,
and distributed consensus among blockchain nodes.
4.1. Lightweight Block Generation Mechanism
At the blockchain layer, the gateway nodes participate
in block generation, block validation, and distributed
consensus in a private blockchain network. In a private
blockchain, nodes need to have permissions to partici-
pate in the network. Since the gateway nodes are known
by the network and have permissions to generate blocks,
they do not need to compete for block generation us-
ing computationally expensive block mining mechanisms.
We propose a lightweight block generation mechanism,
where gateways generate blocks in periodic intervals.
After receiving all the associated sensor transactions, the
gateway validates these transactions and calculates the
evidences and the sensor reputations to assign trust
values for the sensor observations. Then, it generates
a block with transactions containing observation data,
the public key and the signature of the data source, the
assigned trust value for the observation, and the updated
reputation of the data source. The gateway node waits
for its turn to multicast the block to the other blockchain
nodes for validation. The block generation time periods
for the gateways can be adjusted based on the sensor
data rate and the latency of data collection and block
generation.
4.2. Reputation-based Adaptive Block Validation
The proposed block validation mechanism adapts the
block validation scheme based on the reputation of the
block generating node Rep(Gi ) and the number of val-
idator nodes Nval . The integration of trust management
in the block verification mechanism improves the block
validation and is managed by the gateway reputation
module of our architecture.
Depending on the reputation of the block generating
node, each validator randomly validates a percentage of
the transactions in the block. The idea behind using
reputation for adaptive block validation can be explained
by
P(successful attack)= P(attack succeeds | attack) P(attack)
(8)
where higher reputation of a node can be perceived as
a lower node attack probability. For a target P(successful
attack) threshold, if P(attack)is low, the system can toler-
ate a higher P(attack succeeds|attack). In terms of block
validation, that corresponds to validating a smaller num-
ber transactions in a block generated by a gateway with
high reputation. We can model the relative effect of
the reputation on the percentage of transactions to be
validated with a linearly decreasing function.
The percentage of the transactions to be validated
also depends on the number of validators. For a fixed
probability of invalid block detection target, as the num-
ber of validators increases, the percentage of transactions
required to be validated by each validator node decreases.
Following the adaptive block validation logic, validator
nodes validate a percentage of the transactions in a block.
Consequently, there is a risk of not detecting invalid
transactions in a given block. The probability of not
detecting any invalid transactions by Nval validator nodes
given that there are T xi nval invalid transactions in the
block can be calculated as follows:
P(no inval. detection | T xi nval )=
(T xtot al−T xi nvalT xval )(T xtot al
T xval
)
Nval
(9)
where T xtot al is the number of transactions in the block
and T xval is the number of transactions to be validated
by each validator node. There are
(T xtot al
T xval
)
ways to choose
a subset of T xval transactions to be validated out of
which
(T xtot al−T xi nval
T xval
)
of them does not include any in-
valid transactions.
Figure 4 shows the impact of number of validators
and the number of invalid transactions in a block on
the probability of not detecting any invalid transactions
during block validation. When the number of validators
increases, we can reduce the percentage of transactions
that need to be validated without sacrificing the invalid
transaction detection performance. For 20 validators, the
probability of not detecting a single invalid transaction
among 100 transactions is below 0.08% when each val-
idator validates only 30% of the transactions. If there are
more than one invalid transaction, the probability of not
detecting any invalid transactions decreases significantly.
The minimum number of validators required to
achieve a target probability threshold of not detecting any
invalid transactions for a given number of transactions
validated by each validator is shown in Figure 5. As an
example, to achieve the 0.1% no detection probability
threshold for an invalid transaction, we need at least
25 validators, each validating 25 transactions in a block
of 100 transactions. The same threshold can also be
achieved by 14 validators, each validating 40 transactions.
Based on these observations, we consider an adaptive
block validation mechanism, where the Percentage of the
Validated Transactions (PV T ) decreases with the reputa-
tion of the block generating node (Rep) and the number
of validator nodes (Nval ) as:
PV T = (γ0+γ1Rep)×e−δNval ×100% (10)
where δ is a controlling parameter determining the effect
of Nval on PV T , and γ0 and γ1 are the parameters of an
affine function determining the effect of Rep on PV T .
For large values of δ, PV T decreases quickly with Nval
and this may result in a lower probability of detection of
invalid blocks. For small values of δ, increasing Nval does
not decrease PV T enough, and causes higher number of
transactions to be validated than needed. The proposed
adaptive block validation scheme can reduce the compu-
tational cost of block validation process significantly, and
improve the scalability and latency of the proposed trust
architecture.
4.3. Distributed Consensus Mechanism
As a result of block validation, a validator either
multicasts a "VALID" message to confirm that the block
is valid, or an "INVALID TRANSACTION ID" message to
notify other nodes about an invalid transaction in the
block. If all the validators multicast "VALID" messages,
then the block is appended to the blockchain by the
nodes. However, if a blockchain node receives "INVALID
TRANSACTION ID" messages for a block, it validates
the transactions given by the Invalid Transaction IDs.
If at least one transaction is found to be invalid, the
block is rejected by the node. If all the transactions are
verified to be valid, then the block appended to the
blockchain. A malicious validator may keep broadcasting
"INVALID TRANSACTION ID" messages and try to waste
the network resources by forcing all the transactions
in the block to be validated. To mitigate such attacks,
during the consensus period, each validator is allowed to
multicast only one message, either confirming the valid
Figure 4: Probability of not detecting any invalid transactions in a block with T xtot al = 100 transactions for Nval = 1,5,
20.
Figure 5: Number of validators required for a target prob-
ability threshold of not detecting an invalid transaction in
a block as a function of number of validated transactions
by each validator.
block or containing the transaction ID for only one invalid
transaction.
5. Performance Evaluation
We divide the performance analysis of the architecture
into two parts: (1) the performance of the data trust
module, and (2) the end-to-end performance of the pro-
posed trust architecture. To illustrate how the proposed
architecture works, we consider an indoor target localiza-
tion application in a smart construction environment 1,
where IoT devices collect data from the construction site
to monitor all stages of the construction project. Fig.6
shows the simulation scenario and the sensor placement
in ROOM1, while a target is monitored by sensor nodes
placed in ROOM1, ROOM2, and ROOM3. Each room has
a gateway node associated with 48 sensor nodes in the
room.
1. https://www.probuild.com.au/news/news/probuild-announces-
tripartite-collaboration-with-csiros-data61-ynomia-and-probuild
5.1. Trust Evaluation at the Data Layer
This section analyzes the data trust module’s ability
to assign higher trust values to honest nodes and lower
trust values to malicious nodes in the presence of mali-
cious observations. Assume that an unauthorized vehicle
(target) enters a restricted construction area (ROOM1).
The target periodically broadcasts beacons and ROOM1
is monitored by K = 48 IoT sensor nodes, which can hear
these beacons. The sensors report the RSSI values and
the confidence of their observations to the associated
gateway by appending their public keys and signing the
transactions with their private keys. These RSSI values can
be used for target detection and localization in the appli-
cation layer. Furthermore, we consider that a sensor node
may be malicious or malfunctioning and its observation
of the target movement may deviate from the true target
path. We assume that the honest sensor nodes report
RSSI observations for the target track ( ), and malicious
sensor nodes report RSSI observations for the malicious
track ( ) as shown in Fig 6.
The RSSI(dB) value of a sensor node at an arbitrary
distance d from the target can be defined with a log-
normal shadowing model as:
RSSI (d)=RSSI (d0)−10α log10
(
d
d0
)
+Xσ (11)
where RSSI (d0) represents the received signal strength
at a reference distance d0, α is the environment-specific
pathloss exponent, and Xδ ∼N (0, σ2) is a normal vari-
able, which represents the variation of the received power
due to fading [19]. The minimum received RSSI value
by the sensor nodes is assumed to be -120dB. As shown
in Fig 6, the pathloss exponent α changes due to the
pathloss environment (e.g. walls, doors, etc.).
We model the confidence of an RSSI observation
based on the intuition that the sensor nodes with very
high RSSI values would have the maximum confidence
in the range of the target. Conversely, sensor nodes with
RSSI values below the receiver sensitivity would have a
lower constant confidence value. The intuition behind
setting a lower confidence value for no target detection
is as follows. If honest nodes detect no target, they can
Figure 6: Simulation scenario.
Figure 7: RSSI values of ROOM1 sen-
sor nodes (RSSI (d0)=−44.8dB , d0 =
1m, and σ= 1).
Figure 8: Trust values of sensor ob-
servations assigned by the gateway
node.
report a fixed lower confidence for their observation.
A malicious node falsely claiming the absence of the
target can therefore not gain a disproportionate advan-
tage over honest nodes by setting high confidence in its
false observation. Conversely, setting the target absence
confidence to be non-zero avoids a minority of malicious
nodes falsely claiming the presence of a target with high
confidence and representing a majority view. Observa-
tions where the RSSI values are moderate are assigned a
confidence based on a linear function as follows:
Con f i dence(RSSI )=

1, if RSSI >−50
0.4, if RSSI <−90
9
4 + RSSI40 , otherwise.
(12)
The specific values of the confidence function were de-
rived empirically for our scenario. The simulated RSSI
values reported by the sensor nodes are shown in Fig. 7,
where 12 of the sensor nodes are malicious and report
RSSI values corresponding to the malicious track while
the other 36 sensors report true observations of the target
track shown in Fig. 6. Since the data sent by the sensor
nodes may be inaccurate or tampered with, upon receiv-
ing the transactions, the gateway validates the transaction
signatures and assigns the trust values shown in Fig. 8
to the transactions using our data trust module. The
trust value of the malicious node decreases significantly
when the malicious track deviates from the true target
track, and can be detected as a malicious observation.
For the simulations, we assumed that the sensor nodes
are neighbors if the distance between them are less than
10m and their sensor observations support each other if
the observed RSSI difference is less than 25dB.
Clearly, the performance of the data trust module
depends on the ratio of malicious nodes to honest nodes,
and the observation confidences. Next, we investigate
analytically the maximum number of malicious nodes
the data trust module can tolerate as a function of the
observation confidences and the total number of nodes
when all the sensor nodes associated with a gateway node
are assumed to be neighbors. Consider two disjoint sets
of nodes, i.e. honest nodes Sh and malicious nodes Sm,
Figure 9: The number of malicious nodes |Sm| that the
data trust module can tolerate for T con fm = 1 and K =
100.
such that |Sh|+ |Sm| =K and
Tr epi j = Tr eph ,T con fi j = T con fh for Si j ∈ Sh
Tr epi j = Tr epm ,T con fi j = T con fm for Si j ∈ Sm
For the worst case scenario of colluding malicious nodes,
let us assume that the members of a set share the same
evidence value:
Tsensi j =
|Sh|−1∑
k=1
T con fh −
|Sm|∑
k=1
T con fm for Si j ∈ Sh (13)
Tsensi j =
|Sm|−1∑
k=1
T con fm −
|Sh|∑
k=1
T con fh for Si j ∈ Sm (14)
Furthermore, malicious nodes can behave like honest
nodes to build similar reputations not to get detected
before behaving maliciously, i.e. Tr eph = Tr epm . Based
on these assumptions, the tolerable region, where the
data trust module is capable of assigning higher trust
values to the honest nodes Tr usth than the trust values
assigned to the malicious nodes Tr ustm is given by:
Tr usth > Tr ustm
TsenshTr ephT con fh > TsensmTr epmT con fm (15)
For Tr eph = Tr epm , substituting Eq. 13 and Eq. 14 in
Eq. 15:
((|Sh|−1)T con fh −|Sm|T con fm)T con fh >
((|Sm|−1)T con fm − (|Sh|)T con fh)T con fm (16)
While honest nodes report their true confidence levels,
malicious nodes may report higher confidence levels. For
T con fm ,T con fh > 0, Eq. 16 can be stated as:
K + c−1
c+1 > |Sm| (17)
where c is the ratio of confidences c = T con fmT con fh .
Fig. 9 shows the number of malicious nodes |Sm| the
data trust module can tolerate as a function of the con-
fidence of the honest nodes T con fh when the malicious
nodes report the maximum confidence T con fm = 1 and
K = 100. As the confidence of the honest nodes increases,
the tolerable number of malicious nodes increases. When
the honest and malicious nodes report the same con-
fidence T con fh = T con fm = 1, the tolerable number of
malicious nodes reaches its maximum value of 49 out
of 100. When half or more of the nodes are malicious,
the data trust module can not assign the trust values
correctly.
5.2. End-to-End Implementation
For end-to-end performance analysis, we used the ns-
3 network simulator with our lightweight blockchain ar-
chitecture. RSSI measurements were generated according
to the simulation scenario shown in Fig. 6, where each
room has a gateway associated with 48 sensor nodes.
Using our lightweight block generation mechanism, 3
gateways generate blocks every 4.5s. We also assume that
there are some other blockchain nodes, which do not
generate any blocks. Together with the gateways, these
blockchain nodes participate in the block validation and
consensus mechanisms.
The validators follow the adaptive block validation
mechanism described in Sec. 4.2. When T xtot al = 48, the
number of transactions to be validated by each validator
can be calculated by
PV T = (4.7/4− (0.7/4)Rep)×e−0.03Nval ×100%(18)
T xval = dT xtot al ×PV T e (19)
where the parameters for Eq. 18 are determined empiri-
cally (the optimization of parameters will be considered
in future work) such that the probability of not detecting
any invalid transactions by Nval validators given that
there is 1 invalid transaction in the block is not ’high’.
Table 1 shows the number of transactions randomly
validated by each validator. Last two columns show the
number of transactions to be validated by each validator
for a given probability threshold for not detecting an
invalid transaction given that there is 1 invalid transaction
in the block. For example, when Nval = 15 and Rep = 1,
each validator validates 31 transactions randomly chosen
out of 48. Whereas, if the gateway has reputation Rep = 5,
each validator validates only 10 transactions. Note that,
TABLE 1: Number of transactions to be validated
Reputation P(no invalid detection)
Nval 1 2 3 4 5 < 0.001 < 0.0001
5 42 35 27 20 13 36 41
10 36 30 24 17 11 24 29
15 31 26 20 15 10 18 23
in this case, the probability of not detecting an invalid
transaction given that there is 1 invalid transaction in
the block is ≈ 0.03. Although this probability may be
high, we need to multiply this probability with the attack
probability of a gateway node with high reputation to get
the probability of a successful attack as in Eq. 8. If the
attack probability of a gateway with Rep = 5 is less than
≈ 0.033, the probability of a successful attack becomes
less than 0.001. If there is 1 invalid transaction in the
block, for Nval = 15, each validator should validate at least
18 transactions so that the probability of not detecting the
invalid transaction in the block is less than 0.001. There
is a tradeoff between the computational cost of block
validation and the probability of a successful attack by a
malicious gateway.
5.3. Invalid Block Detection Performance
In this section, a gateway with initial reputation Rep =
3 generates 205 valid, 105 invalid, and 105 valid blocks
in order, running a single simulation. Fig. 10 shows the
reputation evolution of the gateway for ∆R = 0.01 and the
invalid block detection performance of the adaptive block
validation scheme using the number of transactions to be
validated given by Eq. 19. The reputation of the gateway
increases during the period it generates 200 valid blocks
and reaches the maximum reputation Rep = 5. Thus,
we simulate the worst case scenario for invalid block
detection, since the gateway has maximum reputation
when it starts generating invalid blocks. The figure shows
that for a small number of validators (Nval = 5) and a
small reputation reduction step (0.01), the invalid block
detection performance is low for the cases where the
number of invalid transactions in a block is low (1 or
2).
The invalid block detection performance improves by
increasing the number of validators. For Nval = 15, when
there is more than 1 invalid transaction in the invalid
blocks, all invalid blocks have been detected. Increasing
the reputation reduction step also improves the detection
performance. However, a steep reputation reduction re-
sults in a higher number of transactions to be validated
by the validators.
Note that, when there are 10 invalid transactions in
the invalid blocks, all invalid blocks have been detected
by all of the simulated schemes, as the probability of de-
tecting at least one of the invalid transactions approaches
one.
Figure 10: Invalid block detection performance and reputation evolution for a simulated scenario (δ= 0.03).
5.4. Delay Analysis
We analyze the latencies caused by the proposed trust
architecture by comparing it with a baseline blockchain
application without a trust architecture and adaptive
block validation.
Fig. 11 shows the block validation latency (the time
required to validate a block), the blockchain layer latency
(the time it takes for a generated block to be appended
to the blockchain), and the end-to-end latency (the time
it takes for sensor observations to be appended to the
blockchain) for the proposed trust architecture and the
baseline blockchain application.
In the baseline case, a gateway node creates a block
of sensor observations by verifying the signatures of the
transactions. In the proposed scheme, a gateway node
needs to calculate the trust values for the observations
in addition to verifying the transaction signatures.
In the baseline case, blocks are validated by only
verifying the signatures of all the transactions. In the
proposed scheme, a percentage of the transactions are
validated depending on the reputation of the gateway
node. However, validation requires checking the signa-
tures and recalculating the trust values.
The block validation, blockchain layer, and end-to-
end latencies of the proposed scheme is higher than the
baseline when the gateway nodes have low reputation,
and lower than the baseline when the gateway nodes have
high reputation. However, the difference is relatively low,
with the proposed approach adding less than 0.3% end-
to-end delay over the baseline, since most of the delay is
common for the baseline and the proposed architecture
(due to packet transfers from sensor nodes to gateways
and among blockchain nodes).
6. Security Analysis
This section considers attack scenarios that can be
implemented by sensor nodes, blockchain nodes, or ex-
ternal attackers, and the response of the proposed archi-
tecture. We assume that the sensor nodes and the gateway
nodes are registered to the network during initialization
by a trusted entity. Their public keys are published in their
profiles and they have secure mechanisms to generate
and keep their private keys.
Malicious sensor nodes can try to tamper with their
observations. The proposed data trust module uses ev-
idence of other node observations, the reputation of
the sensor node, and the reported confidence levels to
Figure 11: Latency of the proposed trust architecture compared to a baseline blockchain based scheme
assign a trust value to the observation. As long as the
tampered observation is not supported by other node
observations, the observation will be assigned a low trust
value depending on the reputation of the sensor node
and the confidence of its observation. Furthermore, the
reputation of the node is decreased for future observa-
tions. In order to increase the probability of a successful
attack, malicious sensor nodes may collude to tamper
with their observations, such that the tampered observa-
tions support each other. For the collusion attack to be
successful, the number of malicious nodes should exceed
bound given in Eq. 17, which depends on the number of
sensor nodes, and the ratio of confidences of malicious
and honest nodes.
Malicious gateways: Malicious gateways can generate
invalid blocks by tampering transactions, or assigning
fake trust values to transactions. During block validation,
the validators try to verify the block generated by the
malicious node. If the transactions are changed by the
gateway, the signatures of the sensor nodes correspond-
ing to the tampered transactions cannot be verified. If the
transaction trust values are not assigned according to the
architecture, this would also be detected by the validators,
as they recompute the trust values for the transactions
during block validation. Once the block is invalidated by
the validator nodes, the reputation of the gateway node
is downgraded. Since the reputation module updates the
block validation process depending on the reputation of
gateway nodes, the blocks generated by the malicious
gateway will be subjected to a stricter validation process.
If the malicious node repeats creating invalid blocks, it
is isolated from the blockchain network and the data
sources connected to that node are associated with a new
gateway node.
Colluding blockchain nodes: Malicious blockchain
nodes can collude to validate invalid blocks. For a
blockchain network with a large number of validators, the
success probability of this attack would be very low, as it
would require a large number of malicious validators. If
the blockchain network has a lower number of validators,
the choice of block validating nodes can be randomized
to mitigate the collusion of malicious block validating
nodes.
Impersonation: An external attacker may try to im-
personate a sensor node or a blockchain node. This attack
requires the attacker to have access to the private key of
the attacked node as all transactions are signed using the
private keys of the nodes, whose public keys are known
and used for verification of the transactions.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a layered architecture
for improving the end-to-end trust that can be applied
to a diverse range of blockchain-based IoT applications.
The proposed architecture can also be used for other
applications involving physical observations being stored
on blockchains (e.g. healthcare, social media anaysis,
etc.).
At the data layer, the gateways can calculate the trust
for sensor observations based on the data they receive
from neighboring sensor nodes, the reputation of the sen-
sor node, and the observation confidence. If the neigh-
boring sensor nodes are associated with different gateway
nodes, then, the gateway nodes may share the evidence
with their neighboring gateway nodes to calculate the
observation trust values. This case will be investigated
further in our future work.
In the proposed architecture, the computational com-
plexity of calculating the trust values is O(K 2), where K
is the number of sensor nodes in a cluster with highly
correlated observations. The number of spatially proximal
nodes is finite and is not large given the practical sensor
node densities in real deployments, which reduces the
computational cost of calculating trust values within a
cluster. When the number of sensor nodes in a cluster
is high, nodes can be clustered further for improving the
complexity.
We have implemented the data trust and blockchain
mechanisms on a custom private blockchain for end-to-
end performance analysis. It can also be implemented
on major public (e.g. block validation for Ethereum
blockchain can be adapted through the Ethereum source
code) and private blockchain (e.g. the Hyperledger block
validation logic can be adapted through Hyperledger Fab-
ric [20]) platforms.
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